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1. Introduction 
Currently, many observers in both the European Community (EC) and US are 
grappling with the potential implications for the food industry of the planned completion of 
the EC internal market by 1993. It seems useful at this stage, therefore, to outline some of 
the findings concerning the impact of the 1992 programme on the food industry and to 
review the conceptual basis for such results. The starting point of the discussion is an 
outline of the broad headings under which EC integration can be examined. Much of the 
literature on 1992 draws a distinction between the micro and macroeconomic impacts, and 
whilst some of the estimates of the macroeconomic effects are based on the aggregation of 
sectoral effects, the distinction is useful in pinning down the general and specific impact of 
1992 on the food industry. 
At the macroeconomic level, completion of the internal market is expected to result 
in an increase in economic growth. For example, the European Commission (1988), in what 
is popularly known as the Cecchini Report, has estimated that removal of internal barriers 
to trade will result in a once-off increase in EC gross domestic product (GDP) of between 
2.5 and 6.5 per cent. Baldwin (1989) argues that there may be more dynamic growth effects 
that were ignored in the Commission's estimates which will generate a permanent increase 
in EC growth rates. It is important, therefore, to lay out the economic reasoning for 
increases in economic growth and its likely implications for the EC food industry. 
At the microeconomic level, the process of harmonisation and removal of non-tariff 
barriers is likely to have a number of effects at the industry level. A priori, it is expected 
that completion of the internal market will increase the volume of intra-EC trade, generate 
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more competition in national markets and result in the fuller realisation of economies of 
scale at the firm level. Customs union theory also suggests that the removal of internal 
barriers to trade may generate either an increase or a decrease in extra-EC imports. 
As well as the above effects, it is argued that completion of the internal marKet will 
allow firms to act on an integrated, EC-wide basis, rather than on a fragmented, national 
market basis. A priori, this will remove the market power that firms have in a particular 
market and substitute it with an EC average degree of market power within any particular 
industry. In principle, this ought to be pro-competitive as the extent to which firms can 
maintain prices in domestic markets will be reduced. Smith and Venables (1988) argue that 
this aspect of 1992 is, " ... much closer to the spirit of what is meant by 'completing the 
internal market' than is a mere reduction in trade barriers ... " (p.1502) 
Given the distinction between the macro and microeconomic effects of 1992, the 
remainder of the paper is concerned with evaluating these for the EC food industry. Section 
2 focusses on the impact of an increase in EC GDP on the demand for food. Whilst no 
estimates of this effect have been published, a simple "back-of-the-envelope" experiment is 
conducted using a range of estimates for the expected increase in EC GDP. Section 3 
considers the microeconomic estimates for the impact of 1992, reference being made to the 
European Commission's results which appear to be the most wide-ranging to date. Finally, 
in Section 4 some suggestions are put forward for ways in which estimates of the effects on 
the food industry could be improved. 
3 
2. Macroeconomic Effects of 1992 
As noted above, the European Commission has estimated that the efficiency effects 
of reducing internal trade barriers will result in a one-time increase in EC GDP of between 
2.5 and 6.5 per cent1• These estimates are based on the summation of microeconomic 
gains2 across sectors for seven EC countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and UK, hereafter denoted as EC7) who, in 1985, accounted for 88 per cent 
of EC12 GDP. As Peck (1989) points out, implicit in the estimates are the assumptions that 
resources will be fully employed as structural change occurs and that there are no political 
obstacles to re-structuring. 
Although the Commission's estimates are based on the summation of microeconomic 
effects, it is possible to treat the gains at an aggregate level. Following Baldwin and 
Dornbusch (1989), suppose that the EC-wide relation between GDP and inputs can be 
characterised by the following Cobb-Douglas type function: 
where K is the capital stock, L is the amount of labour employed, and j is an efficiency 
parameter. The parameter b reflects the extent of aggregate scale economies, i.e. if b > 0, 
there are scale effects. Traditional growth theory assumes that b = 0, increases in GDP being 
1 Differing ranges in the effects on GDP are reported by various authors. The range noted here is that 
recorded in the introduction to the Commission's report and quoted by Baldwin. 
2 It should be noted that the Commission did run some macroeconometric forecasts indicating an increase 
in GDP of 4.5 per cent in the medium-term. 
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explained in terms of exogenous technical progress, i.e. the production function exhibits 
diminishing marginal returns to capital, growth being determined by a shift in the function. 
In Figure 1, the curve YY is drawn upon the assumption that capital is varied, labour 
held constant, and there are diminishing returns to capital. SS is drawn assuming that the 
economy invests some constant fraction of GDP. Some investment goes towards servicing 
the depreciation of the existing capital stock, the remainder being a net addition capital. 
In equilibrium, investment is entirely devoted to replacing existing capital, i.e. at K* where 
DD crosses SS, DD being drawn for a constant rate of depreciation. GDP 1 is therefore the 
equilibrium growth rate for the capital stock K*. 
Baldwin and Dornbusch argue that the Commission has estimated a one-time change 
in the value of the parameter j which shifts up the production function to Y'Y' and hence 
the investment function to S' S'. With the existing capital stock, growth is from a to a', 
however there is an additional boost to growth from a' to a'' as the economy moves towards 
the new equilibrium capital stock K**. 
If there are economy-wide returns to scale, then the function YY in Figure 1 will 
have a less pronounced curvature and so the new steady-state capital stock will be even 
larger and hence the increase in GDP is greater. Baldwin describes these effects as the 
medium-term impact of 1992, which he argues the Commission underestimated. However, 
this is still a once-off effect, amplified by the impact of scale economies, as the economy 
ultimately settles to a new steady-state capital stock K**. For differing estimates of the 
output-capital elasticity (a+ b), Baldwin has calculated, through a simulation model, both the 
static and medium-term effects of 1992. Overall his results indicate that with economies of 
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scale, EC GDP will grow by between 3.4 and 8.7 per cent3, suggesting that the Commission 
underestimated the static effects by about 30 per cent. 
Suppose, however, that the parameters in the production function are no longer 
constrained to sum to less than 1, rather (a+ b);;:: 1. In the case of (a+ b)> 1, economies of 
scale are sufficiently important to generate accelerating economic growth, which seems 
implausible. However, Romer (1987) has argued that (a+b):::::1, in which case a permanent 
increase in the growth rate can be sustained as the capital-labour ratio never reaches a 
stable equilibrium. Allowing for the long-term growth effects, Baldwin estimates that 
completion of the internal market would increase discounted future EC GDP by between 
11 and 35 per cent4• 
Given the various forecasts of the impact of 1992 on EC GDP, it ought, in principle, 
to be possible to calculate likely demand shifts in the EC food industry. Assuming increases 
in GDP are equivalent to increases in income, Table 1 contains the results of a simple 
experiment where, for both the Commission and Baldwin estimates of the once-off increase 
in GDP, the impact on the EC food industry post-1992 is calculated, given a forecast value 
of food industry output in 1992 (Euromonitor) and an estimate5 of the EC's elasticity of 
food expenditure with respect to GDP. 
3 This range is based on a "low" estimate of economies of scale. See Baldwin, Tables 2 
and 3. 
4 It should be noted that Baldwin's estimates have been criticised by Venables (1989) as 
being very sensitive to assumptions about the savings ratio. 
5 This is a crude estimate based on a log-linear regression of EC12 food expenditure per 
capita on EC12 GDP per capita. 
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Table 1 Forecast Changes in EC Food Industry 
Commission Estimates 
Baldwin Low 
Estimates2 Estimate 
Euromonitor Estimates 
High 
Estimate 
Change in EC GDP 
(%) 
2.5 
6.5 
3.4 
8.7 
5.5 
15.7 
EC Food 1 Industry 
($billion) 
557.9 
571.5 
560.9 
579.0 
568.1 
602.9 
559.1 
1. Based on Euromonitor forecast for 1992 of $549.4 billion and assuming an EC elasticity 
of 0.62. 
2. See Baldwin for estimates based on high and low values for the output-capital elasticity 
(a+b). 
The results suggest that the EC food industry will experience a once-and-for-all 
increase in sales in the range $8.5 billion to $53.5 billion, i.e a growth of 1.5 to 9.7 per cent, 
which compares to a forecast annual average growth rate of 1.1 per cent over the period 
1988-92. Clearly such estimates are open to challenge, and perhaps most important, 
aggregate figures for the EC hide structural differences in the demand for food across the 
member states. Whilst all EC countries show a declining proportion of household 
expenditures being accounted for by spending on food, tobacco and alcohol products, there 
are marked differences in food expenditures as shown in Table 2. These differences largely 
reflect the relative stages of economic development in the Community and can be explained 
by reference to Engel's Law. A priori, one would expect the impact of 1992 to have less of 
an effect in the most developed EC states, although expenditure effects are likely to be 
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present as increasing incomes shift food purchasing patterns towards higher-quality products 
and eating away from home. 
Table 2 Share of Consumer Expenditure on Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco in EC12 (%) 
1979 1987 
Belgium 22.5 20.6 
Denmark 26.0 22.6 
France 22.4 20.1 
Germany 20.0 16.7 
Greece 36.5 38.1 
Ireland 42.4 41.8 
Italy 32.5 23.5 
Luxembourg 22.7 22.5 
Netherlands 22.2 18.7 
Portugal 37.1 
Spain 26.1 
United Kingdom 23.0 17.9 
Source: Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1980, 1988. 
3. Microeconomic Impact of 1992 
(i) Importance of Trade Barriers 
In examining the microeconomic impact of 1992, it is useful first to consider the nature of 
remaining trade barriers within the EC and their importance in the food industry. Barriers 
to trade are normally divided into two categories, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but 
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given that internal tariffs (bar Monetary Compensatory Amounts, MCAs) have largely been 
eliminated within the Community, the focus of the Commission's 1985 White Paper was on 
the latter type of barrier. Specifically, the Commission identified three types of non-tariff 
barrier; physical frontiers at intra-EC customs posts, technical frontiers such as differing 
product standards, and fiscal frontiers in the form of different levels of value-added tax. 
In theory, non-tariff barriers to trade of this type will have two effects. First, they 
impose a cost on consumers in an importing country through higher prices, and unlike a 
tariff, there is no offsetting government revenue. Higher prices are maintained as either 
inefficient or monopolistic domestic firms are protected from import competition. Second, 
exporting firms bear the cost of dealing with the non-tariff barriers. In principle, therefore, 
the impact of such barriers can be measured in terms of both their cost and also the extent 
to which prices in the EC diverge from the law of one price. 
In the case of the EC food industry, a study of the cost of barriers was conducted on 
behalf of the Commission by Groupe Mac6• They studied ten product sectors covering; 
biscuits, ice-cream, chocolate, beer, mineral water, pasta, soup, baby-food, non-alcoholic 
beverages and spirits, which accounted for 17.6 per cent of EC food expenditures in 19857• 
For these ten products, a total of 218 non-tariff barriers were identified and classified into 
five types as shown in Table 3. 
6 A French-based consultancy firm. 
7 This covered Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands and the UK. 
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Table 3 Non-Tariff Barriers in the EC Food Industry 
Specific Import Restrictions 
Packaging/Labelling Laws 
Specific Ingredient Restrictions 
Content/Denomination Regulations 
Fiscal Discrimination 
Total 
Source: Groupe Mac 
Number of 
Barriers 
64 
68 
33 
39 
14 
218 
%of Total 
29.4 
31.2 
15.1 
17.9 
6.4 
100.0 
From the 218 barriers, 15 were selected for further analysis, and Table 4 summarises 
Groupe Mac's estimates for cost savings from removing these barriers. The total effect from 
their removal is calculated to be in the range 440 to 975 million ECU per annum, which 
represents between 0.66 and 1.5 per cent of the industry's turnover. A number of comments 
can be made on the results. First, for the 15 barriers chosen, 6 accounted for the bulk of 
the gains, and of these, the European Court has already ruled on beer and pasta purity. 
Second, the difference between direct and total benefits is defined to be indirect benefits, 
i.e. increased competition, restructuring and increased trade, however, the report only 
quantified these effects for the German beer industry, hence the bulk of the estimates are 
based on the assumption of lower material costs. Third, the benefits from removing the 
remaining 200 barriers appear to have been extrapolated from the pilot sample. 
Clearly there are many barriers to trade in food products and of the 300 Commission 
directives regarding barrier removal, 105 relate to food and agriculture. However, the 
Groupe Mac estimates of their height have to be regarded as both partial and 
"guesstimates". As Swinbank (1990a) points out, "too much credence should not be placed 
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on the numbers generated", and he notes that, "on occasions the presentation is so glib and 
superficial that serious doubts are bound to be raised about the quality of the underlying 
research". 
Table 4 Effects of Non-Tariff Barrier Removal in Food Industry (million ECU/annum) 
Barrier Country Direct Total 
Benefit Benefit 
Beer Purity Germany 15-20 105-235 
Pasta Purity Italy 35-100 35-100 
Aspartame France 0-10 0-10 
Vegetable Fat (Chocolate) France 190-235 190-235 
Vegetable Fat (Ice-Cream) Germany 75-100 75-100 
Beverage Containers Denmark <1 <1 
Beer Wort Tax UK <1 <1 
Health Regulations (Baby Food) Spain <1 <1 
Bulk Transport (Mineral Water) France <1 <1 
Saccharine Italy 20-45 20-45 
Chlorine (Biscuits) UK <1 <1 
Soup Labelling Spain <5 <5 
German Water Germany <1 <1 
Plastic Containers Italy 15-50 15-50 
Double Inspection Spain <1 <1 
Other Barriers 0-200 0-200 
Total 350-775 440-975 
Source: Groupe Mac. 
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Table 5 Price Dispersion 1 in EC Food Products 
Without Taxes With Taxes 
Product 
1975 1980 1985 1975 1980 1985 
Rice 17.95 17.98 9.87 20.38 20.43 11.60 
Flour, Other Cereals 20.79 7.37 15.74 22.94 12.52 17.85 
Bread, Cakes and Biscuits 12.83 12.96 11.50 15.81 17.16 15.17 
Noodles, Macaroni, Spaghetti 12.40 11.94 8.86 13.78 14.34 11.01 
Beef 21.27 17.55 11.32 23.99 19.96 14.32 
Veal 10.59 23.29 16.45 13.67 21.93 15.94 
Pork 10.95 9.49 14.96 14.24 13.37 20.53 
Mutton, Lamb, Goat Meat 23.85 18.20 10.28 26.48 20.07 12.30 
Poultry 11.61 9.27 10.46 14.88 9.74 14.58 
Delicatessen 17.45 12.38 21.00 20.73 16.02 23.58 
Meat Preparations, Other Meat Products 15.10 18.04 11.17 15.58 22.60 14.48 
Fish and Other Seafood 13.72 13.26 1:>.54 16.54 16.53 15.41 
Fresh Milk 12.28 13.11 1551 14.01 12.90 16.90 
Milk, Preserved 18.37 19.81 24.GO 19.00 16.95 22.23 
Cheese 11.71 12.41 11.33 14.08 18.68 13.78 
Eggs 8.87 7.22 15.60 11.54 10.60 17.61 
Butter, Animal, Vegetable Fats 18.64 15.44 5.39 20.83 13.80 10.05 
Edible Oils 23.29 22.15 22.35 25.44 24.13 23.24 
Fresh Fruits 24.34 16.76 16.02 28.43 18.27 19.01 
Fruits Dried, Frozen, Presetved, and Juice 15.81 10.91 14.57 18.08 13.69 19.09 
Fresh Vegetables 19.29 25.48 24.99 23.54 30.37 27.59 
Vegetables Dried, Frozen, Presetved, Soups 14.18 16.47 12.08 16.66 20.36 20.06 
Potatoes 27.55 27.79 28.41 31.72 31.71 29.14 
Sugar 14.40 26.27 17.94 10.55 33.12 19.19 
Coffee and Cocoa 20.33 17.84 10.81 28.97 27.39 14.18 
Tea 41.93 30.87 26.94 46.02 37.27 23.04 
Chocolate and Confectionary 26.61 22.27 19.21 33.09 25.99 16.57 
Jams, Honey, Syrups, Ice-Cream 16.59 10.67 16.83 16.95 12.43 19.89 
Mineral Water, Soft Drinks 17.15 25.98 24.87 21.68 31.60 33.15 
Liqueurs and Spirits 14.80 11.55 18.25 :n.47 47.06 37.24 
Wine and Cider 15.90 33.36 15.88 22.64 58.86 41.54 
Beer 24.26 25.71 20.94 26.55 34.30 41.45 
Cigarettes 10.39 19.60 15.84 49.61 51.73 42.13 
35.35 35.44 23.01 28.38 34.41 43.56 
ource: urostat 
1. Standard deviation of prices relative to the EC average. 
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As well as the Groupe Mac study, the Commission also estimated the extent of price 
dispersion across various product groups for the years 1975, 1980 and 1985, using price data 
collected by Eurostat8• The results for food and related products are shown in Table 5, 
where the figures reported measure the standard deviation of prices relative to the 
Community average9• The data suggest that there is quite a large difference in food 
product prices between member states, even if differences in transport and marketing costs 
are taken into account. The results also indicate that a significant part of the price 
differences is due to varying levels of indirect tax. The Commission concludes that, "It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the removal of non-tariff barriers will have a direct 
impact on the dispersion of prices" (p.122). 
(ii) Removal of Trade Barriers 
As noted earlier, the microeconomic effects of 1992 can be divided into two basic areas. 
First, removal of non-tariff barriers is expected to generate trade and associated 
gains/losses, which can be analysed using partial equilibrium, customs union theory. Second, 
following the removal of barriers, there may be a market integration effect generated by the 
increased realisation of economies of scale and greater competition between firms. As Cox 
and Harris (1985) have shown in their modelling of the US-Canada free trade agreement, 
when economies of scale and imperfect competition are taken into account, the market 
8 This data is drawn from the five-year price review nia<te by Eurostat used to calculate 
purchasing power parities. 
9 The absolute price differences between certain countries tend to be even larger. 
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integration effects of trade liberalisation may be considerably higher than those predicted 
by neoclassical trade theory. 
(a) Direct Trade Barrier Effects 
The Commission in its evaluation of 1992 has basically followed this dichotomy of effects. 
Focussing first on the orthodox gains/losses from removal of trade barriers, the analysis 
assumes that markets are perfectly competitive, goods are homogeneous and firms' cost 
functions exhibit non-increasing returns to scale. The basic result of removing trade barriers 
can be considered in a three-country framework where one EC country, I, imports from the 
rest of the Community, C, and the rest of the world, R. 
Figure 2 illustrates the case using excess supply and demand curves. ED1 is the 
import demand curve for country I, whilst (EC+ ER') is the aggregate export supply curve 
for the remaining EC countries and the rest of the world. It is assumed that a per unit 
common external tariff is levied on imports from R, shifting up its supply curve from ER 
to ER'. The initial equilibrium is one where the market clears at price P and quantity M, 
with I importing OMc from C and OMR from R. Country I earns tariff revenue of the areas 
(A+ B + H +G), but necessarily foregoes tariff revenue on imports from C. If the non-tariff 
barriers are removed, the export supply curve shifts to EC', moving the aggregate supply 
curve to (EC' + ER' ). The common external tariff is maintained, inclusive of any remaining 
non-tariff barriers. Hence the new equilibrium is at price P' and quantity M', imports by 
I from C increase to OMc' and fall to OMR' from R. 
From this comparative statics exercise a number of welfare changes can be identified: 
-consumers in country I gain surplus made up of the areas (A+B+C+D), whilst there is 
p 
p 
P' 
Pc 
PR 
p~ 
0 
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a net loss in tariff revenue of the area (A+ B + H)-J10• Hence the net welfare gain to I is 
(C+ D-H +J); area Cis the terms of trade gain on the original level of imports from C (i.e. 
the lower price P' prevails); area D is the gain on additional imports from C, i.e. trade 
creation as production in I is replaced by cheaper imports from C; area H is trade diversion 
as imports from R are replaced by more expensive imports from C, i.e a terms of trade loss; 
and area J is a terms of trade gain in getting imports from R at a lower price. 
- for the exporters, Community firms in C gain producer surplus of (E +F), where E is the 
terms of trade gain on existing exports to I and F is the gain from extra exports to I. Rest 
of the world firms lose producer surplus of (J + K) which is a terms of trade loss. 
Clearly the welfare effects outlined are highly sensitive to a number of assumptions. 
First, the removal of non-tariff barriers is assumed not to affect the rest of the world's 
supply curve ER'. It might be argued, for example, that harmonisation of product standards 
will reduce the variable costs11 of exporting to the EC, in which case there may be external 
trade creation. Equally, if the prospect of "fortress Europe"12 is to be believed, then the 
level of trade diversion may be greater. Second, welfare changes are sensitive to the 
assumed values of both the common external tariff and supply and demand elasticities. 
Third, a market structure of perfect competition is assumed, which will result in an over-
estimate of the welfare gains and also a different distribution of the gains if in fact markets 
10 Whilst not shown here, there is also a loss in producer surplus in I as domestic firms' 
output declines in the face of imports from C. 
11 Meeting harmonised standards may of course result in firms incurring initial sunk costs. 
12 A phrase originally due to a vice-president of the EC, de Clerq. 
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are imperfectly competitive. Fourth, the model 1s partial equilibrium in nature, 
consequently, cross-price and income effects are ignored13• 
In focussing on the EC7, the Commission calculated the direct gains from removing 
trade barriers in two stages14: 
- first, in stage 1, the trade and welfare effects were derived as a weighted average of the 
gains for each of the seven EC countries. For a sample of 65 final goods sectors (19 relating 
to food products) based on the NACE, 3-digit classification15, the effect on prices from 
removing tariff barriers was calculated, based on estimates of the cost reductions and 
external estimates of the relevant price elasticities16• From this, changes in intra-EC trade 
flows were estimated, along with the associated changes in consumer and producer surplus. 
Although allowance was made for the possibility that harmonisation of standards will result 
in an increa..<.;e in extra-EC trade, this was not the case for food products. 
- in stage 2, the EC is treated as a single economic entity trading with the rest of the 
world. Focussing on 44 sectors from the NACE classification, (5 relating to the food 
industry), the effects of EC-wide cost reductions on external trade were estimated. This 
estimate takes into account the impact on final goods of cost reductions in intermediate 
goods' trade by using the EC input-output tables. 
13 The authors of the Commission's report do acknowledge these weaknesses. 
14 Estimates made by Cawley and Davenport (1988). 
15 A Community classification similar to the SIC classification system. 
16 See Cawley and Davenport for full coverage of the elasticity data. 
18 
The results of stages 1 and 2 are outlined in Tables 6, 7 and 8, based on 1985 data 
for the EC food industry. Table 6 lists the percentage cost reductions assumed to occur as 
a result of the removal of non-tariff barriers. Column (i) relates only to border formalities 
and is based on a consultancy study by Ernst and Whinney (1987), whereas column (ii) takes 
account of other barriers such as product standards, the estimates being based on a business 
survey conducted by the Commission. The data in column (iii) are scaled down estimates 
of the effects of cost reductions in intermediate goods based on the share in EC output of 
intra-EC trade in intermediates. Also included in column (iii) are the effects of increased 
realisation of scale economies in the production of intermediates and reductions in the costs 
of services. Finally in column (iv), price reductions for agricultural products have been 
incorporated. 
A number of comments can be made on this data. First, the effects of removing 
border formalities in food products are estimated to be less than the average for all 
industries, which is perhaps surprising, whilst inclusion of factors such as product standards 
increases the impact of reducing non-tariff barriers. It is not clear from the Commission's 
report whether the removal of MCAs, which affect the relevant processed products, have 
been assumed in the calculation. Second, once the impact of cost reductions in the 
intermediate sector is considered, the impact on the food sector is above average for meat 
and dairy products. Again it is not clear whether this estimate includes the removal of 
MCAs on agricultural products, although the assumed reduction of agricultural prices would 
seem to imply this. 
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Table 6 Estimated Effects of Removing Barriers for EC Food Industry 
Cost Reduction (%) Cost Reduction(%) 
Stage 1 
(i) (ii) 
ats, Preserves 1.0 2.2 
Dry Products 1.0 2.2 
Other Foods 1.0 2.2 
Beverages 1.0 2.2 
Tobacco Products 1.0 2.2 
Average Across All 1.6 1.9 
Industries 
Source: EC Commission 
(i) Final goods, border formalities 
(ii) Final goods, border formalities and other barriers 
(iii) Effect of cost reductions in intermediate goods (ex c. agriculture) 
(iv) Column (iii) plus agriculture. 
Stage 2 
(iii) (iv) 
0.9 4.0 
1.1 4.3 
1.1 2.6 
1.3 1.7 
0.5 0.7 
2.4 3.0 
Table 7 reports the stage 1 calculation, focussing on changes in intra-EC and extra-
EC imports along with the static welfare gains. The results indicate fairly small changes in 
intra-EC trade in food products relative to the average for all products and smaller than the 
changes predicted for agriculture. In the case of extra-EC imports, where products are 
either directly or indirectly linked to CAP regimes, the change in imports is assumed to be 
zero. For the remaining drink and tobacco products, there are quite significant declines in 
imports, suggesting trade diversion. Overall, the predicted welfare gains of stage 1 are small 
for the EC food industry. 
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Table 7 Effects of Removing Trade Barriers on EC Food Industry: Stage 1 
Change in Intra- Change in Extra- Welfare Gains 
EC Imports (%) EC Imports (%) (billion ECU) 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
Vegetable/ Animal Oils 1.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Meat Preparation 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Dairy Products 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Fruit/Vegetable 0.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Processing 
Fish Processing 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Grain Milling 0.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pasta 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Starch Products 0.8 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bread, Flour 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sugar Refining 1.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cocoa, Chocolate, 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Sugar 
Animal Food 0.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Food 0.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Ethyl Distilling 1.3 2.9 -3.0 -7.2 0.0 0.0 
Wine 2.1 4.9 -1.8 -4.3 0.0 0.0 
Cider, Perry 1.8 4.2 -2.3 -5.5 0.0 0.0 
Brewing 1.2 2.9 -2.9 -7.2 0.0 0.0 
Soft Drinks 1.1 2.4 -3.5 -7.2 0.0 0.0 
Tobacco 0.8 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Agriculture 6.4 5.0 -1.8 -1.4 0.4 0.3 
Average Across All 3.7 4.5 -2.2 -2.6 
Industries 
Source: EC Commission 
(i) and (ii) refer to the different estimates of cost reduction. 
21 
The main question concerning these results is the assumption concerning extra-EC 
imports of products directly /indirectly affected by the CAP. First, if some part of the 
increase in intra-EC imports of food products is due to the removal of MCAs, a priori this 
is likely to affect the level of extra-EC imports, i.e. a degree of trade diversion will bccur 
if existing tariffs remain in place. Second, some authors argue that with the removal of 
MCAs, it will be politically infeasible to allow farm prices in some countries to fall so that 
there will be an increase in the level of protection17• Therefore, for certain processed food 
products the level of extra-EC imports may be expected to fall. 
Table 8 Effects of Removing Trade Barriers on EC Food Industry: Stage 2 
%Change in %Change in Extra- Welfare Gains 
Output EC Imports (billion ECU) 
Product (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) 
Meats, Preserves 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 
Dairy Products 0.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.8 
Other Food 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.2 
Beverages 0.5 0.6 -1.9 -2.5 0.3 0.5 
Tobacco 0.2 0.3 -2.2 -3.2 0.2 0.2 
Agriculture 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.8 
Average Across All 1.3 1.5 -5.7 -7.7 
Industries 
Source: EC Commission 
(i) Excludes agriculture 
(ii) Includes agriculture. 
17 See Swinbank (1990b), Josling (1990) and Ichter (1990) for discussion. 
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In Table 8, the results of the stage 2 calculation are reported for the EC food sector. 
The results suggest that including agriculture in the intermediates sector increases the 
impact of barrier removal. Importantly, the results indicate greater welfare gains at stage 
2 compared to stage 1, although again a question is raised about the zero impact on extra-
EC imports of food products as the reduction in agricultural prices implies something about 
changes in the CAP. 
(b) Market Integration Effects 
Compared to the estimation of direct trade effects from removal of trade barriers, there is 
no general methodology for dealing with the impact on market integration, which follows 
from the recognition of economies of scale and imperfectly competitive market structures. 
Following Peck, a useful stylisation of the potential effects of integration can be outlined. 
Suppose that three firms exist in a particular EC industry, each a monopolist in its domestic 
market. After 1992, only two firms survive in the EC-wide market, so that with the fuller 
realisation of economies of scale, prices fall. Also, after market integration, seller 
concentration declines, i.e. prior to barrier removal, there were three separate monopoly 
market structures, so that the average degree of concentration as measured by the 
Herfindahl index was 1, whereas post-integration, the Herfindahl index falls to 0.5, assuming 
equal market shares for the two firms. Therefore, it is argued that the two firms will 
compete more effectively with each other, reducing "X"-inefficiency and generating a further 
reduction in prices. 
Clearly such a result is sensitive to a number of critical assumptions about technology 
and the nature of competition. First, realisation of economies of scale depends on either 
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existing plants being operated sub-optimally or/ and firms being able to move down their 
long-run average cost curves. Second, the competition gains are dependent on both the pre-
and post-integration games played by firms. Clearly if incumbent firms are able to act as 
monopolists prior to integration and then play a non-cooperative game in quantities after 
integration, the resulting Nash-Cournot outcome will drive down prices. However, it is 
possible for a monopoly market structure to exist with Bertrand price competition18, hence 
a move to integration would not generate an increase in price competition and might 
conceivably result in one firm supplying the whole EC market if products are non-
differentiated19• 
In attempting to quantify these effects, the Commission has adopted two methods of 
calculation. Method 1 separates out the gains due to economies of scale from the 
competition effects, whilst method 2 computes the two gains jointly. Both methods rely on 
a computable, partial equilibrium model developed by Smith and Venables, which belongs 
to a class of models developed in the literature on trade under imperfect competition20• 
This procedure first involves the derivation of a model that captures certain features of 
imperfectly competitive markets. Second, in order to use the model for simulations, it is 
calibrated with data from external empirical sources such that remaining parameters in the 
model are consistent with equilibrium in a given period. 
18 With sunk costs of entry and homogeneous goods, Bertrand price competition will 
ensure only one firm will enter and remain in equilibrium. 
19 If products are differentiated, more than one firm can exist with Bertrand competition 
(see Shaked and Sutton, 1983). 
20 See Norman (1989) for a discussion of such models. 
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Smith and Venables consider a situation where there are multi-brand firms who make 
decisions on output for a given brand and decisions in relation to the number of brands. 
The industry equilibrium is similar to that described by Krugman (1979,1980), where firms 
operate under increasing returns to scale and produce differentiated products, consumers 
have Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)-type preferences21 and the trade equilibrium is characterised 
by intra-industry trade. 
The model itself is quite complex so only an intuition is given here22• The initial 
situation is one where the EC market is segmented such that firms price discriminate 
between markets. Critically, in any firm's first-order condition for profit maximisation, the 
perceived elasticity of demand for a given product depends on both the price elasticity of 
demand for the product and the firm's beliefs about the effect of its actions on industry 
supply. The relevant strategic variable can be either price or quantity, allowing for Bertrand 
and Cournot outcomes respectively. Firms also choose the number of brands they want to 
produce, so that the perceived elasticity will depend on the expected response of other firms 
to a change in the number of brands produced and the impact of a new brand on the 
demand for existing brands. The latter impact will be affected by the game firms play in 
any given period, i.e. if it is Bertrand, prices remain constant and output changes, and vice-
versa for Cournot. 
In equilibrium, if market structure is fixed, then positive profits will be observed, 
however, with free entry/exit, profits will be driven down to zero, i.e. the monopolistic 
21 The utility function is one where all available varieties of goods are consumed. 
22 See Venables and Smith (1986) for a full outline of the model. 
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competition outcome. Once Be integration is allowed for, price discrimination is ruled out 
as firms have to set a single price and sell into an integrated market. Focussing on a 
hypothetical industry where eournot behaviour and a fixed number of brands is assumed, 
it is useful to describe a simulation through the Smith and Venables model. Initially the 
non-tariff barriers are removed (i.e. the direct effects of 1992), such that for a given number 
of firms, intra-Be trade increases, raising competition in each market as the level of seller 
concentration falls. As a result prices decline, raising consumer surplus and reducing firms' 
profits, but as sales expand, average costs fall. If exit is allowed, profits return to their pre-
integration equilibrium, seller concentration rises, prices increase and consumer gains fall 
slightly. The actual welfare gains are positively correlated with the extent of scale 
economies and their impact increases when there is free exit. 
The nature of strategic interaction between firms will also affect the welfare outcome. 
If Bertrand behaviour is assumed, then increased intra-Be trade has less of an effect on 
prices, hence demand and output change by less than the eournot case. For fixed numbers 
of firms, there is less reduction in average costs, whilst for free exit, the smaller price 
reduction induces less exit and so less realisation of economies of scale. In addition, if firms 
introduce new brands after removal of trade barriers, they shorten their production runs on 
existing brands, so there is a trade-off between reduced economies of scale and increased 
economies of scope. Also smaller reductions in average cost are traded-off against the gains 
from increased product variety. 
Turning to market integration, price differences between segmented markets are 
assumed to disappear. Prior to integration, firms price discriminate between their home and 
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foreign markets in order to exploit their market power, i.e. their domestic price-cost margins 
exceed those in foreign markets and Herfindahl indices are high. After integration, price-
cost margins, inclusive of transport costs, must be equalised, and concentration at the EC-
level will fall, i.e. firms can no longer extract monopoly rents from their home markets. As 
prices fall, domestic consumers switch to home output and intra-EC trade declines. The 
decline in market power and prices results in a fall in profits, which, with exit, induces firms 
to leave the market. Economies of scale are reaped by the remaining firms due to both the 
increase in demand and the exit of firms. 
In their actual simulations, Smith and Venables consider a situation where there are 
six countries, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, the rest of the EC and the rest of the world. 
The focus is on ten NACE 3-digit industries, none of which relate to the food sector, and 
in order to calibrate the model they use external data on production, trade flows, Herfindahl 
indices, estimates of scale economies and elasticities of demand. As is often the case with 
simulation models, the data required tend to be patchy and so arbitrary estimates have to 
be used. The results indicate that the welfare gains from market integration are much 
greater than those from the removal of trade barriers. Also, the gains are greater where 
markets are more concentrated and firms act non-competitively, i.e. Cournot behaviour. 
Turning to the Commission's estimates of market integration, it is useful to consider 
method 2 first where the total gains from scale economies and competition are measured. 
The impact of economies of scale was calculated from models developed by Schwalbach 
(1988) and Ranci and Helg (1988) which focus on the gap between existing plant sizes and 
minimum efficient scale, estimates of the latter being based on those made by Pratten 
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(1987). It is important to note that Pratten's estimates were largely based on data from the 
1960s and relate to either the UK, the US or Germany. The results for the food industry 
suggest that at a scale 50 per cent below minimum efficient scale, costs rise in the range 3.5 
to 21 per cent (depending on the product), whilst for drink and tobacco, the range is 1 to 
6 per cent. The parameters used to pick up the effects of scale economies in the food sector 
are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 Economies of Scale Parameters for EC Food Industry 
Product Economies of Scale Economies of Scale 
(i) (ii) 
Meats, Preserves 0.04 1.6 
Dairy Products 0.04 1.6 
Other Food 0.04 1.6 
Beverages 0.04 1.6 
Tobacco Products 0.03 1.6 
Source: EC Commission 
(i) % reduction in cost for a 1% increase in output, given existing plants, i.e. measures 
changes in variable input productivity 
(ii) %reduction in costs due to restructuring as plants closer to minimum efficient scale are 
built. 
Given these estimates, it is argued that market integration will have a more 
pronounced effect where potential economies are large, seller concentration is high and non-
tariff barriers protect inefficient firms. Taking the latter as a base, i.e. the direct gains from 
1992, the Commission calculated scaling coefficients for the market integration effects, the 
coefficients increasing in concentration and scale economies. The values of these 
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coefficients for the food industry are shown in Table 10, based upon the assumption of free 
exit by firms after 1992. These coefficients are derived from an extrapolation of Smith and 
Venables' results, consequently they have to be treated with a good deal of caution as none 
of their sample industries are closely related to food manufacturing. Also included in' this 
table are the scaling coefficients for method 1, where only the effects of increased 
competition are considered, i.e. the values are lower. Again they are based on Smith and 
Venables and should therefore be treated with care. 
Table 10 Scaling Coefficients for Effects of Market Integration on EC Food Industry 
Product Method 1 Method 2 
Meats, Preserves 0.5 1.0 
Dairy products 1.5 2.0 
Other Food 1.5 2.0 
Beverages 1.5 2.5 
Tobacco Products 5.0 5.5 
Source: EC Commission 
Method 1: Ratio of gains from increased competition to gains from removal of barriers 
Method 2: Ratio of gains from scale economies and increased competition to gains from 
removal of barriers. 
Given methods 1 and 2, Table 11 contains the welfare effects of market integration 
for the EC food industry. The important point to note about the results in this table is that 
method 1 generates higher estimates of the total gain than method 2. Also, the relatively 
higher gains for "other food products" are presumably the result of aggregation. 
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Table 11 Welfare Effects of Market Integration on EC Food Industry (billion ECU) 
Method 2 
Economies of 
Scale and 
Economies Increased Method 1 Increased 
Product of Scale Competition Total Competition 
Meats, Preserves 0.9 0.2 1.1 0.5 
Dairy Products 1.1 0.8 1.9 1.1 
Other Food 3.1 1.8 4.8 2.4 
Beverages 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.9 
Tobacco Products 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.0 
Source: EC Commission. 
A number of criticisms can be levelled at the Commission's estimates (see Peck). 
First, it is assumed that economies of scale will be realised, exit will occur and that markets 
will move to equilibrium. However, it is difficult to see how disequilibrium can be 
satisfactorily handled in a simulation model. Second, the Commission reports only those 
estimates based upon Cournot behaviour, variable firm numbers and complete integration. 
Although the choice of Cournot behaviour can be defended on technical grounds23, the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in assumptions about oligopolistic behaviour, freedom 
of exit and so on, is symptomatic of the new literature on trade and imperfect 
competition24• Therefore, the Commission's estimates probably need to be treated as 
upper bounds of the welfare gains from integration. 
23 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown that in a two-stage game, Bertrand pricing 
can be consistent with Cournot outcomes. 
24 See Krugman (1986) for an accessible survey. 
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(c) The Total Effects of 1992 
In concluding this discussion of the microeconomic effects of 1992, Table 12 reports the 
results for the EC food industry of summing the welfare effects due to removal of trade 
barriers and market integration. Overall, depending on the method used to calculate' the 
impact of market integration, the welfare effects of 1992 in the food industry range between 
13.1 and 18.2 billion ECU in 1985 prices, and in the case of method 1, the gains from 
integration outweigh those from removing trade barriers. These welfare gains account for 
9 per cent of the total estimated gains to the EC from 1992, which seems rather high. 
Table 12 Total Welfare Effects of 1992 on EC Food Industry (billion ECU) 
Stage 1 + 2 + Stage 1 + 2 + 
Product Stages 1 + 2 Method 1 Method 2 
Meats, Preserves 1.8 2.9 2.3 
Dairy Products 2.0 3.9 3.0 
Other Food 2.7 7.6 5.1 
Beverages 0.5 2.0 1.4 
Tobacco Products 0.3 1.8 1.3 
Total Food 7.3 18.2 13.1 
Food/All Sectors(%) 9.1 9.7 9.3 
Source: EC Commission 
Stages 1 and 2 refer to the removal of trade barriers. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In summary this paper has reviewed the available results on the possible effects of 1992 on 
the EC food industry, and also the conceptual basis for these results. Essentially a 
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distinction has been made between the macro and microeconomic effects of the completion 
of the internal market. In terms of the macro effects, expected growth in EC GDP over the 
medium-term will shift the aggregate demand for food. A crude, "back-of-the-envelope" 
calculation suggests that the increase might lie anywhere between a 1.5 and 9.7 per cent 
increase in EC food industry sales. In the case of the micro effects, the most comprehensive 
study to date has been undertaken by the European Commission, who have focussed on 
both the direct impact of removing trade barriers and the effects of market integration. 
Overall, their estimates suggest that the welfare gains from 1992 in the food industry lie in 
the region of 13.1 to 18.2 billion ECU. 
As outlined in the review, there are many criticisms that can be levelled at the 
Commission's study, but in many ways an estimate of the Community-wide gains from 1992 
is such a large task that it becomes somewhat of a "straw man". Hence it is critical to 
consider how the estimates of the impact of 1992 on the food industry can be improved, 
particularly as they relate to US-owned firms: 
- first, more robust estimates of the effect of an increase in EC GDP on food industry 
demand need to be developed, particularly at the EC member level. 
-second, whilst gains in intra-EC food trade have been predicted, no effort has been made 
to model the extent to which these gains will accrue to multinationals based in the EC. As 
Tironi (1982) has shown, the distribution of gains and losses from removal of trade barriers 
can be affected by the existence of foreign capital and also the nature of any profits tax 
regime. Assuming a degree of market imperfection, he identifies two effects; first, in an 
importing country where the domestic firms are foreign subsidiaries, there is a foreign profit 
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diversion effect as cheaper imports from the rest of the EC replace goods produced by 
foreign capital. This results in both an increase in consumer surplus and a redistribution 
of income to the importing country, although the size of these effects will depend on the 
extent to which the multinational rents were taxed ex ante. Second, in an exporting country, 
there is a foreign profit creation effect as multinationals involved in trade benefit from the 
removal of trade barriers. Again depending on the tax regime, this may represent a loss in 
national income to the exporting country. Given the leading market position of US food 
multinationals in many EC countries, this is a critical area of research. 
- third, the EC estimates of the effect of removing internal trade barriers on extra-EC 
imports have been set at zero. The validity of this assumption needs to be examined as it 
has clear implications for the effect of 1992 on US food exporters. 
- fourth, there is debate over whether 1992 will lead to the removal of MCAs and the 
effect such removal will have on agricultural and food prices. A priori, it would seem that 
the impact of 1992 on the EC food industry will be highly sensitive to whether or not MCAs 
are included. If removal of MCAs is more dependent on reform the CAP, then the outcome 
of the current GATT negotiations becomes critical. 
- fifth, the EC Commission's estimates of the impact of market integration on the food 
industry are based on an extrapolation from Smith and Venables' simulation model. This 
is clearly unsatisfactory and there is a need for both a more thorough survey of the 
industrial organisation of the EC food industry and modelling of the effects of market 
integration. 
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